2. The notification shall include relevant documentation and an indication of the provisions to be addressed in the negotiations, the objectives of the negotiations and any other relevant information.

Calls on the Commission, in the context of the WTO negotiation rounds and the post-2012 process, to pursue coordinated negotiation strategies in the field of trade and environment policy in order to send its negotiating partners a credible message about Europe's climate targets and the instruments developed to achieve them, to dispel concerns about trade barriers or other disadvantages to trade relations with third countries that have no binding climate objectives, and to implement the reciprocity principle in the interests of combati ...[+++]ng climate change at a global level;

International financial institutions and donors should support more counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies to deal with the negative impact of recessions as well as support social investments from a long term inequality reduction perspective. If growing economies are to improve social cohesion through the fight against poverty, exclusion and inequality, thus laying the foundations of sustained and stable growth, international financial institutions should pay attention to these aspects in the negotiation of macro-economic stability ...[+++]objectives for each country.

In Finland, from 2002 onwards regional plans will be integrated into the NAPs, with ministries and their respective regional bodies negotiating annual targets and resources for the regions.

Difficulties arise because of prevailing uncertainty as regards the way in which "regulated markets" should fulfil their obligations to ensure that all securities comply with the requirements for "official listing" (as specified in Directive 79/279 [10] In essence, the practice to date has been that the regulated market should provide listing functions in respect of all securities which are dealt in on that market. This practice for "regulated markets" officially to list securities prior to trading can add significantly to costs and limit the scope for competing markets and exchanges to admit the same security to trading. admission to listing and admission to trading must therefore be decoupled if more active competition between trading sys ...[+++]tems is to be facilitated. Furthermore, structural changes such as the demutualisation of exchanges call for a redefinition of how listing and public disclosure objectives are realised. However, before such far-reaching adjustments can be envisaged, an equitable basis must be found for sharing the regulatory overheads of listing and fulfilling related requirements such as dissemination of price-sensitive information. Without appropriate arrangements, profit-driven exchanges may seek to divest costly listing functions, particularly if they perceive competitors as "free-riding" on their listing services. This would jeopardise the important "public good" functions served by listing. Implementation of this approach should be foreshadowed in an updated definition of "regulated markets". It also calls for a re-examination of the provisions of Directive 79/279 [11].

Difficulties arise because of prevailing uncertainty as regards the way in which "regulated markets" should fulfil their obligations to ensure that all securities comply with the requirements for "official listing" (as specified in Directive 79/279 [10] In essence, the practice to date has been that the regulated market should provide listing functions in respect of all securities which are dealt in on that market. This practice for "regulated markets" officially to list securities prior to trading can add significantly to costs and limit the scope for competing markets and exchanges to admit the same security to trading. admission to listing and admission to trading must therefore be decoupled if more active competition between trading sys ...[+++]tems is to be facilitated. Furthermore, structural changes such as the demutualisation of exchanges call for a redefinition of how listing and public disclosure objectives are realised. However, before such far-reaching adjustments can be envisaged, an equitable basis must be found for sharing the regulatory overheads of listing and fulfilling related requirements such as dissemination of price-sensitive information. Without appropriate arrangements, profit-driven exchanges may seek to divest costly listing functions, particularly if they perceive competitors as "free-riding" on their listing services. This would jeopardise the important "public good" functions served by listing. Implementation of this approach should be foreshadowed in an updated definition of "regulated markets". It also calls for a re-examination of the provisions of Directive 79/279 [11].