financial risk [ credit risk | default risk | exchange risk | foreign exchange rate risk | interest rate risk | liquidity risk | loan risk | macroprudential risk | market risk | sovereign risk | systematic risk | systemic risk ]

business continuity analyst | business continuity strategist | ICT disaster recovery analyst | ICT resilience analysts

risk management [ enterprise risk management | ERM | risk analysis | risk assessment | risk assessment(UNBIS) ]

Infection precautions education, guidance, counseling

industrial hazard [ explosion hazard | explosion risk | fire danger | fire hazard | fire risk | risk of explosion | technological risk | toxic hazard | toxic risk ]

consortia advisor | corporate risk department manager | credit risk analysts | financial risk analyst

product risks analysis | customer product risks analysis | product usage risks analysis

probabilistic risk analysis | probabilistic risk assessment | probabilistic safety analysis | probabilistic safety assessment | probabilistic safety study | PRA [Abbr.] | PSA [Abbr.]

downside risk

13. Considers that there are different national approaches to assessing the effects of aircraft crashes on the safety of NPPs; notes that ‘aircraft crashes have not been considered explicitly as an initiating event in the safety assessments’, and that only their effects have been outlined in the stress test specifications; regrets, however, the fact that only four Member States have included such assessments in their stress test reports; notes, nonetheless, that the stress test specifications state that ’the assessment of consequences of loss of safety functions is relevant also if the situation is provoked by indirect initiating events for instance (...) air ...[+++]plane crash’; also notes that, given that this risk falls primarily within the area of Member States’ national security concerns and, therefore, sovereignty, an Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS) has been set up with the task of examining the issue in detail and publishing its conclusions; is aware that further exchanges between Member States are planned on that subject within appropriate forums such as the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA); asks all interested stakeholders, including Member States, the Commission, ENSREG, ENSRA and NPP operators, to work together in order to anticipate and agree a common approach to dealing with the risk of aircraft crashes, while recognising that this risk falls within the area of Member States’ national security concerns and sovereignty;

12. Considers that there are different national approaches to assessing the effects of aircraft crashes on the safety of NPPs; notes that ‘aircraft crashes have not been considered explicitly as an initiating event in the safety assessments’, and that only their effects have been outlined in the stress test specifications; regrets, however, the fact that only four Member States have included such assessments in their stress test reports; notes, nonetheless, that the stress test specifications state that ‘the assessment of consequences of loss of safety functions is relevant also if the situation is provoked by indirect initiating events for instance (...) air ...[+++]plane crash’; also notes that, given that this risk falls primarily within the area of Member States’ national security concerns and, therefore, sovereignty, an Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS) has been set up with the task of examining the issue in detail and publishing its conclusions; is aware that further exchanges between Member States are planned on that subject within appropriate forums such as the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA); asks all interested stakeholders, including Member States, the Commission, ENSREG, ENSRA and NPP operators, to work together in order to anticipate and agree a common approach to dealing with the risk of aircraft crashes, while recognising that this risk falls within the area of Member States’ national security concerns and sovereignty;

5. Emphasises that the stress tests are incomplete and that risks such as secondary events, material deterioration, human errors, specific flaws inside the reactor vessels and many other deficiencies were not taken in to account; underlines, therefore, that even if it is successful, a stress tests will not guarantee the safety of a nuclear plant;

31. Calls, in particular, for the establishment of good practices for animal husbandry which minimise the risk of antimicrobial resistance; emphasises that these practices should in particular apply to young animals brought together from different breeders thus increasing the risk of communicable diseases;