3. As from 10 days after the excess has occurred, the components of the excess, selected in accordance with point 1, shall be allocated to the appropriate line in column 1 of Table 1 in ascending order of specific-risk requirements in Annex I and/or requirements in Annex II. The additional capital requirement shall be equal to the sum of the specific-risk requirements in Annex I and/or the Annex II requirements on these components, multiplied by the corresponding factor in column 2 of Table 1.

Only if the amount were EUR 21,6 billion would all conceivable risks mentioned above be covered, so that the group banks’ loans to property service companies, which on account of the risks were being committed and drawn down from rent, renewal and the other above‐mentioned guarantees, play no role in the calculation of the subsidiary banks’ and the group’s own‐funds ratios because they have a 0 % weighting in the calculation and are therefore not included and also not set off against the large‐scale lending limits.

According to indicators from the HNB on non-performing loans, capital adequacy and primary liquidity ratio of banking institutions, the profitability and soundness have improved.

This involves a further amendment to the basic set aside rules set out in Regulation (1765/92): - to encourage further control of production, farmers who set aside more than the obligatory minimum (15%) may also be compensated for the extra fallow land; - to ensure sensible application, Member States may limit the use farmers make of this extra flexibility, for environmental reasons, or to avoid the danger of abandonment of land in certain regions; - farmers will have the possibility to operate both fixed and rotational set-aside on their holdings at the same time; - set-aside compensation to be increased to the equivalent of 57 ECU p ...[+++]er tonne of cereals (from the present 45 ECU per tonne); - at present, under rotational set-aside, the producer may set-aside each part of his land only once, within a period of six years.