2. Member States shall recognise as eligible counterparties for the purposes of this Article investment firms, credit institutions, insurance companies, UCITS and their management companies, pension funds and their management companies, other financial institutions authorised or regulated under Community Ö Union Õ legislation or the national law of a Member State, undertakings exempted from the application of this Directive under Article 2(1)(k) and (l), national governments and their corresponding offices including public bodies that deal with public debt ð at national level ï , central banks and supranational organisations.

the identity of directors and persons responsible for the management of the payment institution and, where relevant, persons responsible for the management of the payment services activities of the payment institution, as well as evidence that they are of good repute and possess appropriate knowledge and experience to perform payment services as determined by the home Member State of the payment institution;

58. notes that, for effective oversight of the systemic and prudential risks of the top market players, the present system of cooperation may need to be strengthened on the basis of the system of cooperation that exists among supervisors, and encourages greater coordination, in particular with respect to prudential risk supervision of multi-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral entities and financial conglomerates; encourages agreements and codes of conduct between Member States and central banks on the financial backing of this system of prudential supervision, with respect to bail-out and lender-of-last-resort obligations where several Me ...[+++]mber States and more supervisors are involved; notes that, to judge whether the present system provides for a real oversight of the systemic and prudential risks of the top players in the market, it is necessary to give the relatively new Level 2 and Level 3 arrangements time to bed down and, at the same time, to look into the desirability and feasibility of EU-level execution of prudential supervision where needed in the future;

58. notes that, for effective oversight of the systemic and prudential risks of the top market players, the present system of cooperation may need to be strengthened on the basis of the system of cooperation that exists among supervisors, and encourages greater coordination, in particular with respect to prudential risk supervision of multi-jurisdictional and cross-sectoral entities and financial conglomerates; encourages agreements and codes of conduct between Member States and central banks on the financial backing of this system of prudential supervision, with respect to bail-out and lender-of-last-resort obligations where several Me ...[+++]mber States and more supervisors are involved; notes that, to judge whether the present system provides for a real oversight of the systemic and prudential risks of the top players in the market, it is necessary to give the relatively new Level 2 and Level 3 arrangements time to bed down and, at the same time, to look into the desirability and feasibility of EU-level execution of prudential supervision where needed in the future;

With regard to managerial issues, these can be summarised as follows: Director-Generals are responsible for routine financial management decisions whilst Commissioners supervise the management of his/her Director-General or Head of Service.

2. Member States shall recognise as eligible counterparties for the purposes of this Article investment firms, credit institutions, insurance companies, UCITS and their management companies, pension funds and their management companies, other financial institutions authorised or regulated under Community legislation or the national law of a Member State, undertakings exempted from the application of this Directive under Article 2(1)(k) and (l), national governments and their corresponding offices including public bodies that deal with public debt, central banks and supranational organisations.