(i) the subsequent reseller is a builder of the unit that is described in paragraphs (b) and (d) of the definition “builder” in subsection 123(1) of the Act but not in paragraphs (a), (c) and (e) of that definition and all or substantially all of the construction of the unit, or all or substantially all of the last substantial renovation of the unit and any subsequent construction or renovation, as the case may be, that is completed at the earlier of the time ownership of the unit is transferred and the time possession of the unit is ...[+++] transferred by the subsequent reseller to the particular individual has been completed by a person other than the subsequent reseller, or

(i) the first reseller is a builder of the complex or unit, as the case may be, that is described in paragraphs (b) and (d) of the definition “builder” in subsection 123(1) of the Act but not in paragraphs (a), (c) and (e) of that definition and all or substantially all of the construction of the complex or unit, or all or substantially all of the last substantial renovation of the complex or unit and any subsequent construction or renovation, as the case may be, that is completed at the earlier of the time ownership of the complex or unit is transferred and the time possess ...[+++]ion of the complex or unit is transferred by the first reseller to the particular person has been completed by a person other than the first reseller, or

16. Notes that issues of major interest to external stakeholders, such as the European Parliament, and subsequent audit requests are neither collected in a structured way nor fully treated as preferential; considers this to be detrimental to the relevance and impact of the Court's audit results; notes, furthermore, that the added value of the Court is directly linked to the use made of its work by Parliament and other stakeholders in the accountability process; invites the Court, therefore, to take into consideration in its annual work programme the political priorities of the legislators and issues of major ...[+++] interest to EU citizens communicated by the Parliament’s Budgetary Control Committee as a channel of EU citizens' concerns;

103. Emphasises that the Court of Auditors' findings in Special Report No 13/2011 were corroborated by the conclusions of the fact-finding mission of Parliament's Committee on Budgetary Control to the ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp, which took place on 19 and 20 September 2012; points out that the Union is a major trading block and that large European ports handle many ships; notes that as a result of logistical pressures, those ports rely on the procedures provided for in the customs regulation and that authorised economic operators gain in importance; notes, however, that Rotterdam, for example, the largest European port granted a h ...[+++]igh-level of simplified custom procedures to importers compared with other major ports in the Union; stresses that the simplification of customs procedures must include a proper and effective risk based policy approach leading to effective control systems avoiding the distortion of competition and that simplified procedures should be effectively monitored regularly by the Commission and Member States; notes that reduced controls could translate into major economic advantages for a port; stresses that any unjustified reduced control may seriously harm the Union's financial interests and that of the Member States;

So, collaboration between national parliaments and the European Parliament could have a major influence on national audit bodies and the European Court of Auditors, in particular in the matter of financial control.

One of the major tasks of the enlarged European Union will be the collaboration between European and National Supreme Audit Institutions.