4. Market operators and investment firms operating a trading venue shall, where a waiver is granted in accordance with Article 9(1)(b), make public at least indicative pre-trade bid and offer prices which are close to the price of the trading interests advertised through their systems in bonds, structured finance products, emission allowances and derivatives traded on a trading venue.

(c) the market model for which pre-trade disclosure may be waived under paragraph 2, and in particular, the applicability of the obligation to trading methods operated by regulated markets which conclude transactions under their rules by reference to prices established outside the regulated market or by periodic auction.

(c) the market model for which pre-trade disclosure may be waived under paragraph 2, and in particular, the applicability of the obligation to trading methods operated by regulated markets which conclude transactions under their rules by reference to prices established outside the regulated market or by periodic auction.

(c)the market model for which pre-trade disclosure may be waived under paragraph 2, and in particular, the applicability of the obligation to trading methods operated by regulated markets which conclude transactions under their rules by reference to prices established outside the regulated market or by periodic auction.

(c) the market model for which pre-trade disclosure may be waived under paragraph 2, and in particular, the applicability of the obligation to trading methods operated by regulated markets which conclude transactions under their rules by reference to prices established outside the regulated market or by periodic auction.

Difficulties arise because of prevailing uncertainty as regards the way in which "regulated markets" should fulfil their obligations to ensure that all securities comply with the requirements for "official listing" (as specified in Directive 79/279 [10] In essence, the practice to date has been that the regulated market should provide listing functions in respect of all securities which are dealt in on that market. This practice for "regulated markets" officially to list securities prior to trading can add significantly to costs and limit the scope for competing markets and exchanges to admit the same security to trading. admission to li ...[+++]sting and admission to trading must therefore be decoupled if more active competition between trading systems is to be facilitated. Furthermore, structural changes such as the demutualisation of exchanges call for a redefinition of how listing and public disclosure objectives are realised. However, before such far-reaching adjustments can be envisaged, an equitable basis must be found for sharing the regulatory overheads of listing and fulfilling related requirements such as dissemination of price-sensitive information. Without appropriate arrangements, profit-driven exchanges may seek to divest costly listing functions, particularly if they perceive competitors as "free-riding" on their listing services. This would jeopardise the important "public good" functions served by listing. Implementation of this approach should be foreshadowed in an updated definition of "regulated markets". It also calls for a re-examination of the provisions of Directive 79/279 [11].