non-arm's-length transaction | NALT | related party transaction | self-dealing

merciless competition

restriction on competition [ discriminatory trading practice | distortion of competition | illegal trade practice | unfair competition | unfair trade practice | distortion of competition(GEMET) | discriminatory trade practices(UNBIS) | unfair competition(UNBIS) ]

EU competition policy [ European Union competition policy | EU competition law(STW) ]

covenant in restraint of competition | non-competition clause | non-competition covenant | non-competition obligation | restraint on competition

import-competing sector

to start operations on an intra-Community route with limited competition

tenderer | bidder

This includes instances where the market is already concentrated, where the proposed concentration would eliminate an important competitive force, where the proposed concentration would combine two important innovators, where the proposed concentration involves a firm that has promising pipeline products or where there are indications that the proposed concentration would allow the merging parties to hinder the expansion of their competitors.

For example, in a scenario in which undertaking A and undertaking B jointly control a joint venture C, a concentration pursuant to which A acquires sole control of C may give rise to competition concerns in circumstances in which C is a direct competitor of A, where C and A will hold a substantial combined market position and where this removes a degree of independence previously held by C .

However,the Commission found no serious competition concerns because the increase in market shares resulting from the transaction is very limited, and the merged entity will continue to face strong competition from other established suppliers.

As regards herbicides, the transaction would have significantly reduced competition for certain types of selective herbicides for cereals, oilseed rape, sunflower, rice and pasture in a number of Member States. As regards insecticides, the transaction would have significantly reduced competition for products controlling for chewing insect and sucking insect in fruits and vegetables and some other crops in a number of Member States in particular in the South of Europe. As regards fungicides, where the parties overlap to a more limited degree, the transaction would have reduced competition for rice blast fungicides in some Member States.