10. Deplores the fact that the Haitians have only shovels, pickaxes and wheelbarrows for clearing (under the ‘cash for work’ scheme) the tonnes of rubble now filling up the capital, which seems totally inadequate in view of the gravity of the situation; stresses that removing the rubble is essential to the reconstruction of Haiti, and is disappointed that hardly any funds have been released for this purpose;

Reasonable grounds could, inter alia, include cases where a suspected or accused person invokes, while giving details, that he is subject to parallel criminal proceedings in respect of the same facts in another Member State, or in case a relevant request for mutual legal assistance by a competent authority in another Member State reveals the possible existence of such parallel criminal proceedings, or in case a police authority provides information to this effect.

Mr Borloo had to get a wheelbarrow filled with 26 frogs to the other side without any of them jumping out, while Mrs Doyle’s mission was to get a whole wheelbarrow full of hundreds of biting frogs to the other side.

Since, in paragraphs 85 to 87 of the judgment under appeal, following an assessment of the facts and evidence, the Court of First Instance found, first, that the mark applied for was devoid of any distinctive character, ab initio, in all of the Member States of the Community and, second, that the appellant did not establish that that mark was the subject of advertising campaigns in certain Member States during the reference period, it rightly found that the figures provided in relation to the advertising costs incurred by the appellant did not provide proof that the mark had acquired distinctive character as a result of the use ...[+++]which had been made of it.

[77] 7 Grounds for refusal: (a) where enforcement would run counter to the fundamental principles of the legal system of the requested State; (b) where the requested State considers the offence for which the sentence was passed to be of a political nature or a purely military one; (c) where the requested State considers that there are substantial grounds for believing that the sentence was brought about or aggravated by considerations of race, religion, nationality or political opinion; (d) where enforcement would be contrary to the international undertakings of the requested State; (e) where the act is already the subject of proceed ...[+++]ings in the requested State or where the requested State decides to institute proceedings in respect of the act; (f) where the competent authorities in the requested State have decided not to take proceedings or to drop proceedings already begun, in respect of the same act; (g) where the act was committed outside the territory of the requesting State; (h) where the requested State is unable to enforce the sentence; (i) where the request is grounded on Article 5.e ("if it considers that it cannot itself enforce the sanction, even by having recourse to extradition, and that the other State can") and none of the other conditions mentioned in that article is fulfilled; (j) where the requested State considers that the requesting State is itself able to enforce the sentence; (k) where the age of the sentenced person at the time of the offence was such that he could not have been prosecuted in the requested State; (l) where under the law of the requested State the sentence imposed can no longer be enforced because of the lapse of time; (m) where and to the extent that the sentence imposes a disqualification.

The Court of First Instance has exclusive jurisdiction to make findings of fact, save where a substantive inaccuracy in its findings is attributable to the documents submitted to it, and to appraise those facts. That appraisal thus does not, save where the clear sense of the evidence produced to it has been distorted, constitute a point of law which is subject, as such, to review by the Court of Justice on appeal (see Case C-104/00 ...[+++] P DKV v OHIM [2002] ECR I-7561, paragraph 22).