19. The members and shareholders of an association are not, by reason only of holding membership shares or shares of the association, liable for any liability, act or default of the association except as otherwise provided by this Act.

B. whereas much of the current crisis has its roots in the launch of the euro, as the currency has major architectural design flaws, which in retrospect suggests it was not fit for purpose; believes that the flaws include lack of oversight, as hundreds of billions of euros have flowed from the so-called core countries to the periphery of the EU, and lack of foresight, as there were no remedial structures in place to deal with the damage caused by this sudden massive transnational movement of currency; whereas all the Member States share a responsibility for the inherent design flaws of the euro, and whereas the deb ...[+++]t burden that has resulted from these flaws is massively disproportionate, with some countries profiting while others have been forced into serious depression; whereas these fundamental flaws and the imbalance have yet to be addressed;

38. Welcomes the fact that financial assistance achieved in the short run the objective of avoiding a disorderly default on sovereign debt that would have had extremely severe economic and social consequences which would have arguably been worse than the current ones, as well as spillover effects for other countries of an incalculable magnitude, and possibly the forced exit of countries from the euro area; notes, however, that there is no guarantee this will be avoided in the long run; also notes that the financial assistance and ad ...[+++]justment programme in Greece has not prevented either an orderly default or a contagion effect of the crisis on other Member States, and that market confidence was restored and spreads on sovereign debt started to come down only when the ECB supplemented actions already taken with the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme in August 2012; deplores the economic and social downturn which became evident when the fiscal and macroeconomic corrections were put in place; notes that the economic and social consequences would have been worse without the EU-IMF financial and technical assistance;

29. Supports the call by the UN Secretary-General at the 2005 High Level Dialogue on Finance for Development to redefine debt sustainability as the level of debt that allows a country to achieve the MDGs by 2015 without an increase in debt ratios, which requires greater complementarity between debt relief and outstanding development financing requirements; regrets therefore that in the new Debt Sustainability Framework for low income countries, the IMF continues to define debt sustainability essentially in terms of export ratios (which is an unreliable predictor of debt sustainability for countries characterised by an extreme vulnerabil ...[+++]ity to shock and steep fluctuations in export earnings), that it lacks realistic assessments of vulnerability and that there is no systematic analysis linking the benefits of the HIPC Initiative and the extra funds needed to achieve the MDGs;

5. Supports the call by the UN Secretary-General at the 2005 High Level Dialogue on Finance for Development to redefine debt sustainability as the level of debt that allows a country to achieve the MDGs by 2015 without an increase in debt ratios, which requires greater complementarity between debt relief and outstanding development financing requirements; regrets therefore that in the new Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries approved in April 2005, the IMF continues to define debt sustainability essentially in terms of export ratios (which is an unreliable predictor of debt sustainability for countries characterised by ...[+++] an extreme vulnerability to shock and steep fluctuations in export earnings), that it lacks realistic assessments of vulnerability and that there is no systematic analysis linking the benefits of the Debt Initiative for Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (the HIPC initiative) and the extra funds needed to achieve the MDGs;

33. Supports the call by the UN Secretary-General at the 2005 High Level Dialogue on Finance for Development to redefine debt sustainability as the level of debt that allows a country to achieve the MDGs by 2015 without an increase in debt ratios, which requires greater complementarity between debt relief and outstanding development financing requirements; regrets therefore that in the new Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries approved in April 2005, the IMF continues to define debt sustainability essentially in terms of export ratios (which is an unreliable predictor of debt sustainability for countries characterised b ...[+++]y an extreme vulnerability to shock and steep fluctuations in export earnings), that it lacks realistic assessments of vulnerability and that there is no systematic analysis linking the benefits of the HIPC Initiative and the extra funds needed to achieve the MDGs;