18. Notes that increased abuse of the Excise Movement Control System (EMCS) by criminal groups has been observed by enforcement agencies; believes that there is a lack of physical controls of goods being transported under the EMCS; stresses that additional investment in controls may result in an increase in collected taxes, and an increase in prevented tax evasion; notes, furthermore, that according to Articles 21(3) and 24(3) of Council Directive 2008/118/EC, the competent authorities of the dispatching and destination Member State will carry out an electronic verification of the data in the draft e-AD and in the report of receipt; ...[+++]strongly believes that criteria should be established according to which goods which are ready for dispatch and/or received must be inspected physically by the competent institution of the Member State;

(Return tabled) Question No. 130 Mr. Francis Scarpaleggia: With regard to rail safety in Canada: (a) for the period of 2006-2012, which railways were permitted to operate with a single operator; (b) for the period of 2006-2012, which railways had permission to leave trains unattended for limited periods of time on main lines with or without an idling locomotive(s); (c) for the period of 2006-2012, which railways had permission to leave trains unattended for limited periods of time on side lines with or without an idling locomotive(s); (d) with regard to the railways in (b) and (c), under what specific conditions could the trains be left unattended; (e) wh ...[+++]at legislative or regulatory framework governs local emergency preparedness plans in the event of a rail accident; (f) with respect to the plans in (e), (i) who is responsible for creating and executing such plans, (ii) by whom are they audited, (iii) how often are they audited, (iv) against what criteria are they audited; (g) by whom and how often are municipalities through which freight trains pass provided with regular reports on (i) the state of local emergency preparedness in the event of a rail accident, (ii) the state and maintenance record of the railway lines within their borders, (iii) the materials, hazardous or not, that are transported through their jurisdiction; (h) if reports referred to in (g) are not provided, why not; (i) how many of the DOT-111 railway tank cars and the DOD-112 tank cars are in use in Canada, for each year since 2006; (j) for each year since 2006, how many rolling stock and track safety inspectors were employed at Transport Canada, broken down by (i) province of work, (ii) oversight responsibility; (k) for each year since 2006, how many rolling stock and track safety inspectors employed by Transport Canada were responsible for inspections in (i) the Greater Montreal Area, (ii) the municipality of Pointe-Claire (iii) the municipality of Beaconsfield, (iv) the municipality ...

Such practices are even more likely to be viewed as a restriction of the buyer's sales when used in conjunction with the implementation by the supplier of a monitoring system aimed at verifying the effective destination of the supplied goods, such as the use of differentiated labels or serial numbers.

Canada doesn't want to be in the position of testing the shipment, finding out what's in it, and putting the proper documentation on it.

These practices are even more likely to be viewed as a restriction of the buyer's sales when used in conjunction with the implementation by the supplier of a monitoring system aimed at verifying the effective destination of the supplied goods, e.g. the use of differentiated labels or serial numbers.