A portfolio management practice which aims to offset the risk linked to an investment in a fixed interest rate bond by combining a long position on a credit default swap and an interest rate swap which swaps that fixed interest rate with an interest rate equal to an appropriate money market reference rate plus a spread should be considered as a hedging arrangement where all the hedging criteria of the commitment method are in principle complied with.

3. The cooperation agreement, referred to in paragraph 2, shall contain rules in particular on: the total amount of the Union contribution and a schedule on how it will be made available; the trust account conditions to be set up by the contracted implementing body; the eligibility criteria for the use of the Union contribution; the details of the exact risk-sharing (including the leverage ratio) to be covered and the guarantees to be provided by the contracted implementing body; the pricing of the risk-sharing instrument based on the risk margin and the coverage of all the administrative costs of the risk-sharing instrument; the ap ...[+++]plication and approval procedure for the project proposals covered by the risk-sharing instrument; the period of availability of the risk-sharing instrument; and the reporting requirements.

For example, EC legislation requires information to be available to consumers concerning: * banking services (e.g. on the existence of deposit-guarantee schemes and, in the case of consumer credit, on credit limits, the annual percentage rate of charges on loans and procedures for terminating loans. Once adopted, the proposed Directive on cross-border transfers will require consumers to be informed concerning the cost and timing of such transfers.) * insurance (e.g. on essential aspects of the contract - before it is signed in the case of life assurance - such as its duration, cancellation rights, the law applicable and complaint procedu ...[+++]res) * securities (e.g. on listing and public offer prospectuses and on information for holders of collective investment funds).

Following the specific amendments agreed by the Commission, the proposal now: - makes clear that a credit institution that also acted as an investment firm could belong to a single compensation scheme as long as the scheme met the requirements of both the deposit-guarantee Directive and the investor compensation Directive - incorporates equivalent clauses to the bank deposit-guarantee Directive concerning the possibility for branches to opt-in to higher levels of compensation in the host country ('top-up'), the regime for branches of firms with their head office in a non-EU country (Member States must ensure home countries schemes offer ...[+++]equivalent cover or oblige branches to join the host country scheme) and the principle that schemes should be financed by investment firms themselves - includes revised definitions of "investment firm" and "branch" which refer to the definitions in the Investment Services Directive and a new definition of "joint investment" - clarifies that authorisation for investment firms is based on the principle of home country control and that no investment firm (other than credit institutions exempted under the deposit-guarantee Directive) could operate unless it participated in an investor compensation scheme - simplifies the definition of when and how the amount of an investor's claim should be determined - makes a specific reference to the exclusion from compensation of any transaction in connection with which there has been a conviction for money-laundering as defined by the Directive on the issue (91/308/EEC) - includes a requirement for continued coverage by the compensation scheme even when a firm's authorisation to operate has been withdrawn (in case it should subsequently transpire that the firm was unable to meet its commitments to investors) - requires the Commission to report on the Directive's operation three years after it is due to be implemented (31.12.96) rather than five years after.

Concerning credit risks of OTC derivative instruments, the proposal would complement the "contractual netting" Directive (see IP/96/172), which came into force in April 1996, in three ways: * firstly, by extending the scope of the Solvency Ratio Directive's compulsory capital coverage for credit risks to all types of OTC derivatives (including notably commodity and equity-related derivatives as well as interest-rate- and foreign exchange-related derivatives) * secondly, by requiring calculation of capital charges for current credit exposure of OTC derivat ...[+++]ives on the basis of more realistic market-values for most of banks' and investment firms' derivatives business and * thirdly by enabling supervisory authorities to allow for a refined calculation of capital charges appropriately reflecting the risk reducing effects of close-out netting on the potential future exposure of netted OTC derivatives (the existing rules allow current exposure to be taken into account). Together, these amendments would ensure a comprehensive and balanced regulation for capital requirements for credit risks inherent in OTC derivatives.

This Directive, which should have been transposed by the Member States before 1 July 1995, requires Member States to set up a system guaranteeing depositors minimum cover of ECU 20 000 in the event of deposits in a credit institution becoming unavailable.