Since the objectives of this Regulation, namely to establish uniform requirements relating to financial instruments in relation to disclosure of trade data, reporting of transactions to the competent authorities, trading of derivatives and shares on organised venues, non-discriminatory access to CCPs, trading venues and benchmarks, product intervention powers and powers on position management and position limits, provision of investment services or activities by third-country firms, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, because, although national competent authorities are better placed to monitor market developments, the ...[+++]overall impact of the problems related to trade transparency, transaction reporting, derivatives trading, and bans of products and practices can only be fully understood in a Union-wide context, but can rather, by reason of its scale and effects, be better achieved at the Union level, the Union may adopt measures, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity as set out in Article 5 of the Treaty on European Union.

Regulation (EU) No 912/2010 should be aligned with the principles contained in the common approach of the European Parliament, the Council and of the Commission to the decentralised agencies, adopted by the three institutions on 5 July, 26 June and 12 June 2012 respectively, particularly with regard to the rules for adopting decisions of the Administrative Board, the terms of office of the members of the Administrative Board and of the Security Accreditation Board and those of their chairpersons, the existence of a multiannual work programme, the powers of the Administrative Board concerning staff management, assessment and revision of that Regulation, prevention and management ...[+++]of conflicts of interest and handling of non-classified but sensitive information.

In order to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of this Regulation, the power to adopt delegated acts in accordance with Article 290 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) should be delegated to the Commission in respect of the accreditation of the paying agencies and coordinating bodies, the obligations of the paying agencies in relation to public intervention, as well as the rules on the content of the management and control responsibilities of those agencies, the measures to be financed by the ...[+++]general budget of the European Union (the Union's budget) under public intervention and the valuation of the operations in connection with public intervention.

In some cases, the absence of effective checks and balances within institutions resulted in a lack of effective oversight of management decision-making, which exacerbated short-term and excessively risky management strategies.

3. When necessary, because of urgency, the Executive Board may take certain provisional decisions on behalf of the Management Board, in particular on administrative management matters, including the suspension of the delegation of the appointing authority powers and budgetary matters

(e) product intervention powers of competent authorities and ESMA and powers of ESMA on position management and position limits;