double running stitch

straight stitch [ straight ]

straight pointed tine

straight point

piercing point of a straight line on a sphere

dividers | divider | straight divider | pair of dividers

point-to-point link | point-to-point connection | point-to-point communication | point-to-point circuit | point-to-point line

[11] The Court of Justice does not refer to the rule of law as simply a formal and procedural requirement, but also highlights its substantive value by specifying that a "Union based on the rule of law" means that the EU institutions are subject to judicial review of the compatibility of their acts not only with the Treaty but "with the general principles of law which include fundamental rights" (see ex pluribus, Case C-50/00 P, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores [2002] ECR I-06677, para 38 and 39; Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, Kadi, [2008], ECR I-06351, para 316).This has been also confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights ...[+++]which gives the rule of law a substantive nature by establishing that it is a concept inherent in all articles of the ECHR (see for example ECtHR Stafford v United Kingdom, 28 May 2001, para 63).

According to Article 4(1) (c) and (d) second sentence, in the case of children under shared custody, the MS may only authorise reunification if the other party sharing custody has given his or her prior agreement. The concept of ‘custody’ can be understood as a set of rights and duties relating to the care of a person of a child, and in particular the right to determine the child’s place of residence.

By their seventh ground of appeal, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law in paragraph 134 of its judgment when it ruled that Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation No 267/2012 (the criterion at issue) is compatible with the principles of the rule of law and more generally with EU law, since it is ‘neither arbitrary nor discretionary’, and, in paragraph 140 of its judgment, that ‘the criterion at issue limits the Council’s discretion, by establishing objective criteria, and guarantees the degree of foreseeability required by EU law’. In that regard, the appellants submit that the General Court erred in law by interpreting the ...[+++]criterion at issue by reference to the judgment of 13 March 2012 in Melli Bank v Council (C-380/09 P).

As the sixth ground of appeal, the appellant claims that the General Court erred in law in paragraph 115 of its judgment by holding that the criterion set out in Article 23(2)(d) of Regulation (EU) No 267/2012 (the contested criterion) is compatible with the principles of the rule of law and more generally with EU law since it is ‘neither arbitrary nor discretionary’ and, in paragraph 123 of its judgment that ‘the contested criterion limits the Council’s power of assessment, by providing for objective criteria, and ensures the level of foreseeability required by EU law’.