13. Takes the view that, in order to develop the full potential of public procurement, the criterion of lowest price should no longer be the determining one for the award of contracts, and that it should, in general, be replaced by the criterion of most economically advantageous tender, in terms of economic, social and environmental benefits – taking into account the entire life-cycle costs of the relevant goods, services or works; stresses that this would not exclude the lowest price as a decisive criterion in the case of highly standardised goods or services; asks the Commission to develop, in close cooperation with the Member States ...[+++], a methodology for the calculation of life-cycle costs on a broad and non-obligatory basis; stresses that supporting the criterion of ‘maximum economic benefit’ would foster innovation and efforts to achieve the best quality and value, i.e. to comply with the requirements of the Europe 2020 strategy; stresses that this is particularly relevant in relation to public procurement of goods that have an impact on consumers' health – in the food sector, for example – where quality and production methods play an important role; emphasises that public procurement rules should be flexible enough to ensure that passive consumers, for example in hospitals, care facilities for the elderly, schools and kindergartens, have equal access to healthy, value-for-money food, rather than merely the cheapest available option;

51. Emphasises the ambiguity with regard to Member States’ right to insist upon social, environmental and quality criteria in public procurement tenders and contracts, and draws attention to the changes in the legal framework brought about by the Lisbon Treaty and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights; in the context of fair trade, the prevention of a race to the bottom and the delivery of quality services, calls for the extension of the concept of ‘most economically advantageous offer’ such that calls for tender and procurement contracts, as well as subcontracts for provision of SGI, including SSGI, would have to include the relev ...[+++]ant Member State's national and/or local social, environmental and service quality criteria, which should be linked to best international practice; stresses that, in order to maintain standards, criteria for acceptance of tenders must not be based solely on price; urges that reforms take into account the specific status of not-for-profit and social economy providers;

This contrasts with our experience in the past, where there has been rather a problem of too much supply and too low prices, and explains the introduction of supply control measures like quotas and set aside and the general thrust for Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) reform, since 1992, to strengthening competitiveness and increasing market orientation by moving away from a policy of price and production support to direct producer support.

If, after the bid has been made public and before the offer closes for acceptance, the offeror or any person acting in concert with him/her purchases securities at a price higher than the offer price, the offeror shall increase his/her offer so that it is not less than the highest price paid for the securities so acquired.

If, after the bid has been made public and before the offer closes for acceptance, the offeror or any person acting in concert with him purchases securities at a price higher than the offer price, the offeror shall increase his offer so that it is not less than the highest price paid for the securities so acquired.

If, after the bid has been made public and before the offer closes for acceptance, the offeror or any person acting in concert with him purchases securities at above the offer price, the offeror shall increase his offer to not less than the highest price paid for the securities so acquired.