3. Notes that widening sovereign interest rate spreads have significantly reduced the room for manoeuvre as regards fiscal policy in a number of Member States; notes, also, that the monetary policy approach taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) has helped to reduce sovereign interest rate spreads; notes that the ECB, through forward guidance, will maintain this policy in the short and medium term, and will thereby contribute to stronger growth;

3. ‘action for damages’ means an action under national law by which an injured party brings individual or jointly a claim for damages before a national court; it also covers actions by which someone acting on behalf of one or more injured parties brings a claim for damages before a national court. National law shall provide for this possibility especially in regards to collective redress. When setting up a collective redress scheme, Member States may only introduce an opt-in system and refrain from foreseeing the use of a contingency fee, the possibility to award punitive damages and third party funding where the fund provider is given ...[+++]remunaration based on the settlement reached or the compensation awarded;

The judgment spoke of the need to have a cognizable Indian interest and the crown undertaking a discretionary control of that interest, and in those kinds of circumstances a fiduciary duty would apply.

4. Regards the income approach chosen by the Commission as mandatory, minimum rules. Believes that in addition lobbyists should be obliged to disclose lobbying expenditure among other things by giving the same information on lobbying expenditure spent on MEPs as MEPs are obliged to disclose in their financial declarations;

In this respect, the Commission should be able to adopt measures determining the procedures under which AIFM managing portfolios of AIF whose assets under management do not exceed the threshold set out in this Directive may exercise their right to be treated as AIFM covered by this Directive. These measures are also designed to specify the criteria to be used by competent authorities to assess whether AIFM comply with their obligations as regards their conduct of business, the type of conflicts of interests AIFM have to identify, as w ...[+++]ell as the reasonable steps AIFM are expected to take in terms of internal and organizational procedures in order to identify, prevent, manage and disclose conflicts of interest. They are designed to specify the risk management requirements to be employed by AIFM as a function of the risks which the AIFM incurs on behalf of the AIF that it manages as well as any arrangements needed to enable AIFM to manage the particular risks associated with short selling transactions, including any relevant restrictions that might be needed to protect the AIF from undue risk exposures. They are designed to specify the liquidity management requirements of this Directive and in particular the minimum liquidity requirements for AIF. They are designed to specify the requirements that originators of securitisation instruments have to meet in order for an AIFM to be allowed to invest in such instruments issued after 1 January 2011. They are as well designed to specify the requirements that AIFM have to comply with when investing in such securitisation instruments. They are designed to specify the criteria under which a valuator can be considered independent in the meaning of this Directive. They are designed to specify the conditions under which the delegation of AIFM functions should be approved and the conditions under which the manager could no longer be considered to be the manager of the AIF in case of excessive delegation. They are designed to specify ...

The other risk, which would be similar, is that you could have the interest rate risk on the corporate security and that generalized rise in interest rates and capital loss relative to the purchase price of the security.