Non-cash means of payment represent an important source of illicit revenue for organised crime groups through fraud and counterfeiting.

28. Calls on the Commission to propose a better SEPA governance, covering the organisational setup related to the development of the main features of payment services and of the implementation of the requirements which need to be met, and allowing the development of technical and security standards to be organised separately in support of the implementation of the related legislation; calls for a more balanced representation of all stakeholders in the further development of common technical and security standards for payment schemes; urges the Commission to answer its previous calls for reform of SEPA governance so as to ensure better representati ...[+++]on of payment services users in the decision-making and standard-setting process; notes that these stakeholders ay include – but are not necessarily restricted to – the EPC, consumer organisations, merchant organisations and large retail chains, the European Banking Authority (EBA), the Commission, experts in various fields, non-banking payment service providers, and mobile, internet and card commerce and mobile network operators; calls on these stakeholders to arrange their work under a new governance structure where the SEPA Council has a role; considers that the SEPA Council should be assisted by various technical committees, or ‘task forces’ for e-payment, m-payment, cards, cash and other standardisation issues, and by ad hoc working groups; recalls the Commission's commitment, in the declaration on SEPA governance on the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012, to come up with proposal before the end of 2012; calls on European standardisation bodies such as the European Committee for Standardisation (Comité Européen de Normalisation, CEN) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), in cooperation with the Commission, to play a more active role in standardising card payments;

28. Calls on the Commission to propose a better SEPA governance, covering the organisational setup related to the development of the main features of payment services and of the implementation of the requirements which need to be met, and allowing the development of technical and security standards to be organised separately in support of the implementation of the related legislation; calls for a more balanced representation of all stakeholders in the further development of common technical and security standards for payment schemes; urges the Commission to answer its previous calls for reform of SEPA governance so as to ensure better representati ...[+++]on of payment services users in the decision-making and standard-setting process; notes that these stakeholders ay include – but are not necessarily restricted to – the EPC, consumer organisations, merchant organisations and large retail chains, the European Banking Authority (EBA), the Commission, experts in various fields, non-banking payment service providers, and mobile, internet and card commerce and mobile network operators; calls on these stakeholders to arrange their work under a new governance structure where the SEPA Council has a role; considers that the SEPA Council should be assisted by various technical committees, or ‘task forces’ for e-payment, m-payment, cards, cash and other standardisation issues, and by ad hoc working groups; recalls the Commission's commitment, in the declaration on SEPA governance on the adoption of Regulation (EU) No 260/2012, to come up with proposal before the end of 2012; calls on European standardisation bodies such as the European Committee for Standardisation (Comité Européen de Normalisation, CEN) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), in cooperation with the Commission, to play a more active role in standardising card payments;

Under the proposed dispute settlement process, the setting up of ad hoc NAFO panels could be blocked if objecting members found enough allies, which would be easier to do under a two-thirds voting rule ([96]) The decisions of ad hoc panels appear to have no legal force to overrule or suspend objections, and could lead to further Fisheries Commission meetings whose decisions could again be open to objections.

Non-cash means of payment (principally credit and debit cards and cheque payments) represent an important source of illicit revenue for organised crime groups through fraud and counterfeiting.

We understood their situation and never criticized the federal government for making ad hoc payments to help them out (1905) We have never blamed them for the fiscal federalism that Quebec is being blamed for through equalization.