(8) The analysis required pursuant to section 37 to verify whether a self-elevating mobile offshore platform is capable of withstanding the loads imposed during transportation shall be performed in accordance with Part 3, Chapter 2, Sections 3 C-100 and D-300 of Det norske Veritas Rules for Classification of Mobile Offshore Units.

13. Considers that there are different national approaches to assessing the effects of aircraft crashes on the safety of NPPs; notes that ‘aircraft crashes have not been considered explicitly as an initiating event in the safety assessments’, and that only their effects have been outlined in the stress test specifications; regrets, however, the fact that only four Member States have included such assessments in their stress test reports; notes, nonetheless, that the stress test specifications state that ’the assessment of consequences of loss of safety functions is relevant also if the situation is provoked by indirect initiating events for instance (...) air ...[+++]plane crash’; also notes that, given that this risk falls primarily within the area of Member States’ national security concerns and, therefore, sovereignty, an Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS) has been set up with the task of examining the issue in detail and publishing its conclusions; is aware that further exchanges between Member States are planned on that subject within appropriate forums such as the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA); asks all interested stakeholders, including Member States, the Commission, ENSREG, ENSRA and NPP operators, to work together in order to anticipate and agree a common approach to dealing with the risk of aircraft crashes, while recognising that this risk falls within the area of Member States’ national security concerns and sovereignty;

12. Considers that there are different national approaches to assessing the effects of aircraft crashes on the safety of NPPs; notes that ‘aircraft crashes have not been considered explicitly as an initiating event in the safety assessments’, and that only their effects have been outlined in the stress test specifications; regrets, however, the fact that only four Member States have included such assessments in their stress test reports; notes, nonetheless, that the stress test specifications state that ‘the assessment of consequences of loss of safety functions is relevant also if the situation is provoked by indirect initiating events for instance (...) air ...[+++]plane crash’; also notes that, given that this risk falls primarily within the area of Member States’ national security concerns and, therefore, sovereignty, an Ad Hoc Group on Nuclear Security (AHGNS) has been set up with the task of examining the issue in detail and publishing its conclusions; is aware that further exchanges between Member States are planned on that subject within appropriate forums such as the European Nuclear Security Regulators Association (ENSRA); asks all interested stakeholders, including Member States, the Commission, ENSREG, ENSRA and NPP operators, to work together in order to anticipate and agree a common approach to dealing with the risk of aircraft crashes, while recognising that this risk falls within the area of Member States’ national security concerns and sovereignty;

20. Asks, in the interests of efficient policymaking and a transparent public debate, for the initial estimated total cost of the necessary safety improvement measures recommended following the stress tests for the 132 reactors operating in the EU (EUR 10 to 25 billion over the coming years) to be further substantiated by a more detailed cost analysis, to be carried out by the national regulators in cooperation with the nuclear operators and, if possible, linked to the choice of identified recommendations; considers that, whatever th ...[+++]e costs of such improvements, they must be borne entirely by the nuclear operators and not by the taxpayer; calls on the Commission to monitor this issue closely, including in the context of its competences in competition policy;

19. Asks, in the interests of efficient policymaking and a transparent public debate, for the initial estimated total cost of the necessary safety improvement measures recommended following the stress tests for the 132 reactors operating in the EU (EUR 10 to 25 billion over the coming years) to be further substantiated by a more detailed cost analysis, to be carried out by the national regulators in cooperation with the nuclear operators and, if possible, linked to the choice of identified recommendations; considers that, whatever th ...[+++]e costs of such improvements, they must be borne entirely by the nuclear operators and not by the taxpayer; calls on the Commission to monitor this issue closely, including in the context of its competences in competition policy;

On the request of the Commission an impact assessment of the policy options has been performed, systematically checking the effects on the emergency preparedness, i.e. the capacity of the EU to cope with a possible oil supply disruption, as well as financial and administrative burden faced by Member States, the industry and the Commission.