participating preferred share [ participating preferred stock | participating preferred | participating share | participating preference share | participating stock ]

nonparticipating preferred shares | nonparticipating preference shares | nonparticipating preferred stock | nonparticipating shares | nonparticipating stock

participating preferred shares | participating preference shares | participating preferred stock | participating shares | participating stock

participating preference share | participating preferred share

participating stock [ participating preferred stock ]

non-participating preference share | non-participating preferred share

non-participating preferred shares [ nonparticipating preferred shares | nonparticipating preferred stock | nonparticiping preference shares ]

To ensure that the activities of the regulatory agencies are consistent with the Community executive function, provision must be made for special relations between them and the Commission: in addition to the existing proposals (direct participation in the appointment of the Director and in the adoption of certain acts of major importance, participation on the administrative board, performance of audits), provision must be made ensuring that the Commission can exercise its role as the guardian of Community law and its overall responsib ...[+++]ility for implementation of the Community budget.

(b) provisions authorizing the directors of the Corporation to fix the number of shares in, and to determine the designation, rights, privileges, restrictions and conditions attaching to shares of, each series of senior preferred shares, public preferred shares or preferred shares designated on or after the day on which a certificate of continuance of the Corporation is issued; and

54. Points equally to the potential conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States, as well as its mandate under the Treaty as it has made its own actions conditional on decisions it is itself part of; nonetheless, welcomes its contribution in addressing the crisis but requests that potential ECB conflicts of interest, especially as regards crucial liquidity policy, are carefully scrutinised; notes that throughout the crisis the ECB has had crucial information on the health of the banking sector and financial stability in general, and ...[+++]that with this in mind it has subsequently exerted policy leverage on decision-makers, at least in the cases of the Greek debt restructuring, where the ECB insisted that CACs were to be removed from government bonds it held, the Cypriot ELA operations, and the Irish non-inclusion of senior-bondholders in the bail-in; calls on the ECB to publish the letter of 19 November 2010 from Jean-Claude Trichet to the then Irish Finance Minister, as requested by the European Ombudsman;

54. Points equally to the potential conflict of interest between the current role of the ECB in the Troika as ‘technical advisor’ and its position as creditor of the four Member States, as well as its mandate under the Treaty as it has made its own actions conditional on decisions it is itself part of; nonetheless, welcomes its contribution in addressing the crisis but requests that potential ECB conflicts of interest, especially as regards crucial liquidity policy, are carefully scrutinised; notes that throughout the crisis the ECB has had crucial information on the health of the banking sector and financial stability in general, and ...[+++]that with this in mind it has subsequently exerted policy leverage on decision-makers, at least in the cases of the Greek debt restructuring, where the ECB insisted that CACs were to be removed from government bonds it held, the Cypriot ELA operations, and the Irish non-inclusion of senior-bondholders in the bail-in;