in the field of traffic monitoring covered by Directive 2002/59/EC, the Agency shall in particular promote cooperation between riparian States in the shipping areas concerned, as well as develop and operate the European Union Long-Range Identification and Tracking of Ships European Data Centre and the Union Maritime Information and Exchange System (SafeSeaNet) as referred to in Articles 6b and 22a of that Directive as well as the International Long-Range Identification and Tracking information data exchange system ...[+++] in accordance with the commitment made in the International Maritime Organisation (“IMO”);

Information on transfers, changes, suspensions, and withdrawals of class, including information on all overdue surveys, overdue recommendations, conditions of class, operating conditions or operating restrictions issued against their classed ships, irrespective of the flag the ships fly, shall also be communicated electronically to the common inspection database used by the Member States for the implementation of Directive 2009/16/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009 on port State control (9) at the same time as it is recorded within the recognised organisat ...[+++]ion’s own systems and in any case no later than 72 hours after the event that gave rise to the obligation to communicate the information.

* Possibilities should be explored to work together on ship tracking systems, maritime police authorities and harmonisation of information and legislation to facilitate investigation and prosecution of perpetrators.

It calls upon the Commission to continue its endeavours in full cooperation with the Member States through the Research Programme Committees. 3. The Council notes that certain research goals require experimentation on an appropriate scale, in particular in the areas of rail traffic management (BRTMS), the use of satellite navigation systems (GNSS), road toll systems and shipping information systems (VTMIS).

SCENT is not just a messaging system. From its terminal, a Member State also has access to the following data bases which allow it to obtain information on certain matters directly: - the CELEX data base: consultation of Community legislation, judgments of the Court, parliamentary questions, etc.; - the COMEXT data base: all Community import and export statistics (by product, by Member State, by country of destination, by weight and by value); analysis of these statistics is a major element in the war on fraud; - LLOYDS data base: all infor ...[+++]mation on shipping (names, types, routes, etc.); this base is used in particular for following the route of ships involved in cases of suspected irregularity.

Rather than wrestle with obtuse notions of asymmetrical threats and fluctuating international terrorist threat levels, I shall address the question under the assumption that, to meet the broad security objectives I mentioned earlier, essentially in the context of exercising control over Canadian waters and being able to make the ports secure, the government needs to be able to do are the following. First, apprehend, quarantine, if necessary, and search any vessel and its cargo, including people; second, conduct underwater searches of ships, berths and access channels; third, conduct explosive ordnance disposal, EOD, operations; fourth, control all movement on the water and ashore within the confines of a port or in a specified coastal ar ...[+++]ea — that is, basically shut down the system, which may be necessary; fifth, transport specialist teams, such as JTF2 and the RCMP teams, to remote locations and offshore installations; sixth, provide physical security for buildings, structures and facilities, such as land line terminals, bridges, locks, radio stations and all the infrastructure that makes the shipping system work; seventh, gather, analyze and disseminate intelligence and operational information; and finally, detain and interrogate suspects.