5. An investment company’s home Member State may decide that investment companies established on its territory which market at least 80 % of their units through one or more stock exchanges designated in their instruments of incorporation are not required to have depositaries within the meaning of this Directive provided that their units are admitted to official listing on the stock exchanges of those Member States within the territories of which the units are marketed, and that any transactions which such an investment company may effect outwith stock exchanges are effected at stock exchange prices only.

It is no coincidence that those Member States that have high levels of share capitalisation, and whose stock exchanges enjoy high levels of turnover in relation to the gross national product, also enjoy more growth and have less unemployment.

The report supports the main thrusts of this directive, despite the differences in ISD model championed by the investment capital lobbies – between the choice of a model known as the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ model, in which investment firms compete fiercely with the stock exchanges, backing the City of London and opening the door to US investment capital, and a system known as the ‘continental’ system, more firmly based on the stock exchanges and preferred by French investment capital.

In certain circumstances, up to three times higher limit values for specific parameters listed in this section (other than dissolved organic carbon (DOC) in sections 2.1.2.1, 2.2.2, 2.3.1 and 2.4.1, BTEX, PCBs and mineral oil in section 2.1.2.2, total organic carbon (TOC) and pH in section 2.3.2 and loss on ignition (LOI) and/or TOC in section 2.4.2, and restricting the possible increase of the limit value for TOC in section 2.1.2.2 to only two times the limit value) are acceptable, if

The limit values for TOC and DOC given in sections 2.3.2 and 2.3.1 shall apply to wastes landfilled together with gypsum-based materials.

Difficulties arise because of prevailing uncertainty as regards the way in which "regulated markets" should fulfil their obligations to ensure that all securities comply with the requirements for "official listing" (as specified in Directive 79/279 [10] In essence, the practice to date has been that the regulated market should provide listing functions in respect of all securities which are dealt in on that market. This practice for "regulated markets" officially to list securities prior to trading can add significantly to costs and limit the scope for competing markets and exchanges to admit the same security to trading. admission to li ...[+++]sting and admission to trading must therefore be decoupled if more active competition between trading systems is to be facilitated. Furthermore, structural changes such as the demutualisation of exchanges call for a redefinition of how listing and public disclosure objectives are realised. However, before such far-reaching adjustments can be envisaged, an equitable basis must be found for sharing the regulatory overheads of listing and fulfilling related requirements such as dissemination of price-sensitive information. Without appropriate arrangements, profit-driven exchanges may seek to divest costly listing functions, particularly if they perceive competitors as "free-riding" on their listing services. This would jeopardise the important "public good" functions served by listing. Implementation of this approach should be foreshadowed in an updated definition of "regulated markets". It also calls for a re-examination of the provisions of Directive 79/279 [11].