Notwithstanding the requirements set out in the Restructuring Communication, point 14 of the Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 January 2012, of State aid rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis (‘the 2011 Prolongation Communication’) (15) specifies that the Commission will ‘undertake a proportionate assessment of the long term viability of banks, taking full account of elements indicating that banks can be viable in the long term without the need for significant restructuring, in particular where the capital shortage is essentially linked to a confidence crisis on sov ...[+++]ereign debt, the public capital injection is limited to the amount necessary to offset losses stemming from marking [European] sovereign bonds to market in banks which are otherwise viable, and the analysis shows that the banks in question did not take excessive risk in acquiring sovereign debt’.

Under the guarantee and recapitalisation scheme if a recapitalisation exceeds 2 % of a bank's risk weighted assets (hereinafter ‘RWA’), the Hungarian authorities must first inform the Commission and provide a detailed assessment on why they believe such a bank should still be regarded as a fundamentally sound institution.

The Commission will determine the need for restructuring through a proportionate assessment of the long-term viability of banks, taking full account of all relevant elements: whether the capital shortage is essentially linked to a confidence crisis on sovereign debt, the public capital injection is limited to the amount necessary to offset losses stemming from marking sovereign bonds of the EEA Member States to market in banks which are otherwise viable, and the analysis shows that the bank in question did not take excessive risk in a ...[+++]cquiring sovereign debt.

The Commission however observes that since the State owned 100 % of ETVA and all the measures implemented by the latter bank are imputable to the State, the separation between the two measures (i.e. guarantee and counter-guarantee) is somehow artificial.

In addition, in past decisions on bank reorganisations, it has regarded a reduction in market presence of 10 % as sufficient in cases where the banks concerned had pursued an expansionary business policy in the years preceding their economic difficulties (10).

The Commission last year started cartel proceedings against banks in Finland, Ireland, Belgium, the Netherlands, Portugal, Germany and Austria, after it gathered evidence that the national groups of banks concerned had colluded to maintain conversion charges at certain levels to minimise losses caused by the introduction of the European single currency, the euro, on 1 January 1999.