At the G20 Summit meeting on 4-5 September, the G20 Leaders called for the establishment of a Global Forum on steel excess capacity to be facilitated by the OECD and with active participation of the G20 members and interested OECD members.

46. Urges the EEAS and the Commission, on the basis of the work done by the European Forum of Member States, to secure an active position within the relevant international forums, inter alia by coordinating the positions of the Member States with a view to promoting the EU's core values, goals and policies in the field of internet security and resilience; notes that such forums include NATO, the UN (in particular through the International Telecommunication Union and the Internet Governance Forum), the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority, the OSCE, the OECD and the World Bank;

26. Notes with concern that billions of dollars per year left the African continent between 1991 and 2004; in particular, underlines that these outflows are estimated at 7,6% of the annual GDP of the region, which makes African countries net creditors of donor countries; considers that ODA and debt relief provided by developed countries will only be effective if concrete measures are taken equally by the G20, the OECD and the EU to ensure that the potential tax base of developing countries is not undermined through tax evasion; encourages in this context the UN and the OECD, in close cooperation with the African Tax Administration Forum, to pursue their wo ...[+++]rk in this area;

16. Calls on the OECD and its Member States to involve the Commission fully in the Global Forum peer review exercise, in particular as regards the identification of non-cooperative jurisdictions, the development of a process for evaluating compliance and the implementation of dissuasive counter-measures to promote adherence to the standards in question; considers, furthermore, that the OECD framework for combating tax havens is unsatisfactory; highlights the need to improve the indicator for achieving the status of a cooperating jurisdiction by, for example, giving it a qualitative value; is critical of the fact that this indicator re ...[+++]quires the conclusion of a mere 12 tax information exchange agreements; regrets, in this context, that the exchange of information takes place only on request rather than being a compulsory and binding requirement, and, furthermore, that the OECD allows governments to escape its blacklist merely by promising to comply with the information exchange principles, without ensuring that those principles are actually put into practice;

16. Calls on the OECD and its Member States to involve the Commission fully in the Global Forum peer review exercise, in particular as regards the identification of non-cooperative jurisdictions, the development of a process for evaluating compliance and the implementation of dissuasive counter-measures to promote adherence to the standards in question; considers, furthermore, that the OECD framework for combating tax havens is unsatisfactory; highlights the need to improve the indicator for achieving the status of a cooperating jurisdiction by, for example, giving it a qualitative value; is critical of the fact that this indicator re ...[+++]quires the conclusion of a mere 12 tax information exchange agreements; regrets, in this context, that the exchange of information takes place only on request rather than being a compulsory and binding requirement, and, furthermore, that the OECD allows governments to escape its blacklist merely by promising to comply with the information exchange principles, without ensuring that those principles are actually put into practice;

16. Calls on the OECD and its Member States to involve the Commission fully in the Global Forum peer review exercise, in particular as regards the identification of non-cooperative jurisdictions, the development of a process for evaluating compliance and the implementation of dissuasive counter-measures to promote adherence to the standards in question; considers, furthermore, that the OECD framework for combating tax havens is unsatisfactory; highlights the need to improve the indicator for achieving the status of a cooperating jurisdiction by, for example, giving it a qualitative value; is critical of the fact that this indicator re ...[+++]quires the conclusion of a mere 12 tax information exchange agreements; regrets, in this context, that the exchange of information takes place only on request rather than being a compulsory and binding requirement, and, furthermore, that the OECD allows governments to escape its blacklist merely by promising to comply with the information exchange principles, without ensuring that those principles are actually put into practice;