‘regular services’ means services which provide for the carriage of passengers by bus or coach at specified intervals along specified routes, passengers being picked up and set down at predetermined stopping points;

where the design of the vehicle or the infrastructure, including bus stops and terminals, makes it physically impossible to take on board, alight or carry the disabled person or person with reduced mobility in a safe and operationally feasible manner.

4. Where a regular service is cancelled or delayed in departure from a bus stop for more than 120 minutes, passengers shall have the right to the continuation or re-routing or reimbursement of the ticket price from the carrier, as referred to in paragraph 1.

Moreover, setting aside the judgment under appeal will, in any event, procure a definite advantage for the Commission inasmuch as, if the action at first instance is ultimately dismissed, it will then be protected from an action for damages by Mr Meierhofer on account of the loss he could claim to have suffered by reason of the decision of 19 June 2007 (see, to that effect, Parliament v Richard, paragraph 34, and Parliament v Samper, paragraph 31, both cases cited in paragraph 41 above).

In that regard, the Civil Service Tribunal took the view that while the examiners marking the written tests, in contrast to the members of the selection board sitting in the oral phase, may admittedly not be known to the persons concerned, and are thereby protected from interference and pressures to which the judgment in Parliament v Innamorati, paragraph 16 above, refers, that circumstance does not objectively justify the existence of significant differences between the requirements concerning the statement of reasons in the case of failure in the written phase, as those requirements are formulated in the case-law cited in paragraph 39 ...[+++]of the judgment under appeal, and those advocated by the Commission in the case of failure in the oral test, which, in particular in the instant case, would consist in giving the applicant only his eliminatory individual mark.

Moreover, setting aside the judgment under appeal will, in any event, procure a definite advantage for the defendant institution inasmuch as, if the action at first instance is ultimately dismissed, it will then be protected from an action for damages by the applicant on account of the loss he could claim to have suffered by reason of the contested decision.