(2c) However, Member States' export credit agencies should carefully examine the applications received taking into account that the official support provided as export credit could potentially in the medium and long term contribute to their Member State's public deficit, in particular considering the increased risk of default due to the aftermath of the financial crisis.

(2p) Social and environmental impact assessment methodology that ensures compliance with export credit requirements should be fully consistent with the principles of the EU Sustainable Development Strategy, the Cotonou Agreement and the European Consensus on Development and should reflect the Union's commitment and obligations under the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the UN Convention on Biological Diversity (UNCBD) as well as the attainment of the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the social, labour and environmental standards as embodied in international agreements ...[+++].

The provision by governments (or special institutions controlled by governments) of export credit guarantee or insurance programmes, of insurance or guarantee programmes against increases in the cost of exported products or of exchange risk programmes, at premium rates which are inadequate to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes.

7. Believes that such a Fast Track Initiative for Coffee Dependent ACP Economies should be financed in the first instance from existing unutilised funds or the 9 EDF ‘B’ allocations which in part are made available to ‘mitigate adverse effects of instability on export earnings’ and should focus on quick-disbursement initiatives designed to:

debt securities issued by central governments or central banks, which securities have a credit assessment by an ECAI or export credit agency recognised as eligible for the purposes of Articles 78 to 83 which has been determined by the competent authority to be associated with credit quality step 4 or above under the rules for the risk weighting of exposures to central governments and central banks under Articles 78 to 83;

(30) The GOI asserts that the DEPB pre-export scheme is a permitted remission/drawback or substitution drawback scheme within the provisions of Annex I(i) to the Basic Decision, and, as such, is non-countervailable.