Uranium Export Contract Review Panel

Contract Review Committee

Uranium Exports Review Panel

23. Stresses the need for greater transparency in energy-related agreements, which could be achieved by strengthening the role of the Commission in energy-related negotiations involving one or more Member States and third countries, in particular by making it a requirement for the Commission to participate in all negotiations as an observer in order to strengthen the position of individual Member States vis-à-vis a third-country supplier involved in the negotiations, so as to mitigate the risks of abuse of a dominant position by one supplier; notes, furthermore, that the Commission should carry out ex-ante and ex-post assessments, while fully respecting commercially sensitive information ...[+++], and draw up both a positive and a negative list of agreement clauses, such as export ban, destination and take-or-pay clauses, the oil indexation of gas pricing or clauses forbidding a third party making energy supplies conditional on being granted preferential access to energy transport infrastructure in the EU; points out that, under Article 13(6)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 994/2010, when concluding new intergovernmental agreements with third countries which have an impact on the development of gas infrastructure and gas supplies, Member States are required to inform the Commission, in order to enable it to assess the situation regarding security of supply at EU level; calls on the Commission to include strong ex-ante assessment provisions on commercial gas supply contracts in the revision of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation;

21. Stresses the need for greater transparency in energy-related agreements, which could be achieved by strengthening the role of the Commission in energy-related negotiations involving one or more Member States and third countries, in particular by making it a requirement for the Commission to participate in all negotiations as an observer in order to strengthen the position of individual Member States vis-à-vis a third-country supplier involved in the negotiations, so as to mitigate the risks of abuse of a dominant position by one supplier; notes, furthermore, that the Commission should carry out ex-ante and ex-post assessments, while fully respecting commercially sensitive information ...[+++], and draw up both a positive and a negative list of agreement clauses, such as export ban, destination and take-or-pay clauses, the oil indexation of gas pricing or clauses forbidding a third party making energy supplies conditional on being granted preferential access to energy transport infrastructure in the EU; points out that, under Article 13(6)(a) of Regulation (EU) No 994/2010/EU, when concluding new intergovernmental agreements with third countries which have an impact on the development of gas infrastructure and gas supplies, Member States are required to inform the Commission, in order to enable it to assess the situation regarding security of supply at EU level; calls on the Commission to include strong ex-ante assessment provisions on commercial gas supply contracts in the revision of the Security of Gas Supply Regulation;

1. Upon condition that a provisional affirmative determination of dumping and injury has been made, the Commission may accept satisfactory voluntary undertaking offers submitted by any exporter to revise its prices or to cease exports at dumped prices, if, after specific consultation of the Advisory Committee, it is satisfied that the injurious effect of the dumping is thereby eliminated.

Where any producer from the People's Republic of China provides sufficient evidence to the Commission that it did not export the goods described in Article 1(1) originating in the People's Republic of China during the period of investigation (1 October 2010 to 30 September 2011); that it is not related to an exporter or producer subject to the measures imposed by this Regulation; and that it has either actually exported the goods concerned or has entered into an irrevocable contractual ...[+++] obligation to export a significant quantity to the Union after the end of the period of investigation, the Council, acting by simple majority on a proposal by the Commission, after consulting the Advisory Committee, may amend Article 1(2) in order to attribute to that producer the duty applicable to cooperating producers not in the sample.