26. Considers that central counterparties with a banking licence should be subject to a central counterparty-specific regime and not to the proposed bank recovery and resolution regime of the bank recovery and resolution directive (BRR); of particular concern in this sense is the fact that the proposed regime for banks would require them to hold an aggregate amount of debt that can be bailed-in; believes such a power would be inappropriate for central counterparties holding a banking licence because they do not tend to issue such debt instruments;

28. Calls, if no separate legislative proposal is imminent, for inclusion in the CSDR of a requirement for national competent authorities to ensure the establishment of appropriate recovery and resolution plans in line with FSB and CPSS-IOSCO international standards for all CSDs, including references to the articles of the BRR that should apply to those CSDs operating under a banking licence;

(41) The Member States should be able to refuse or withdraw a banking authorisation in the case of certain group structures considered inappropriate for carrying on banking activities, because such structures cannot be supervised effectively.

31. Recognises the important role played by money market funds (MMFs) in the financing of financial institutions in the short run and in allowing for risk diversification; recognises the different role and structure of MMFs based in the EU and the US; recognises that the 2010 ESMA guidelines imposed stricter standards on MMFs (credit quality, maturity of underlying securities and better disclosure to investors); notes, however, that some MMFs, in particular those offering a stable net asset value to investors, are vulnerable to massive runs; stresses, therefore, that additional measures need to be taken to improve the resilience of these funds and to cover the liquidity risk; supports the October 2012 IOSCO final report in its proposed ...[+++] recommendations for the regulation and management of MMFs across jurisdictions; believes that MMFs that offer a stable net asset value (NAV) should be subject to measures designed to reduce the specific risks associated with their stable NAV feature and internalise the costs arising from these risks; considers that regulators should require, where workable, a conversion to floating/variable NAV, or, alternatively, safeguards should be introduced to reinforce stable NAV MMFs’ resilience and ability to face significant redemptions; invites the Commission to submit a review of the UCITS framework, with particular focus on the MMF issue, in the first half of 2013, by requiring MMFs either to adopt a variable asset value with a daily evaluation or, if retaining a constant value, to be obliged to apply for a limited-purpose banking licence and be subject to capital and other prudential requirements; stresses that regulatory arbitrage must be minimised; ...

(19) Withdrawal of authorisation to pursue the business of banking is one of the consequences which winding up a credit institution necessarily entails.

(61) The Member States can, furthermore, refuse or withdraw banking authorisation in the case of certain group structures considered inappropriate for carrying on banking activities, in particular because such structures could not be supervised effectively.