This, the effects of congestion and the need for continual balance of supply and demand, increase the scope for market dominance.

This, the effects of congestion and the need for continual balance of supply and demand, increase the scope for market dominance.

But the focus of the Quarterly Report is on the perceived weak response of housing supply to surging prices and on household indebtedness as a counterpart to higher house prices.

2) In the event of a breakdown in supplies, and given the essential role that oil plays in economic and social life, it is expedient not just to leave the market to restore the balance between supply and demand by way of a price hike (which would be the disastrous consequence of the very weak short-term oil demand elasticity): it follows that the public authorities do indeed have a role to play.

It is after all an inelastic supply in certain circumstances, just as it is with doctors in training.

It is true that Council Directive 92/44/EEC of 5 June 1992 on the application of open network provision to leased lines, amended by Commission Decision 94/439/EC (8), harmonizes the basic principles regarding the provision of leased lines, but it only harmonizes the conditions of access and use of leased lines. The aim of that Directive is not to remedy the conflict of interest of the telecommunications organizations as infrastructure and service providers. It does not impose a structural separation between the telecommunications organizations as providers of leased lines and as service providers. Complaints illustrate that even in Member States which have implemented that Directive, telecommunications organizations still use their control ...[+++]of the access conditions to the network at the expense of their competitors in the services market. Complaints show that telecommunications organizations still apply excessive tariffs and that they use information acquired as infrastructure providers regarding the services planned by their competitors, to target clients in the services market. Directive 92/44/EEC only provides for the principle of cost-orientation and does not prevent telecommunications organizations to use the information acquired as capacity provider as regards subscribers' usage patterns, necessary to target specific groups of users, and on price elasticities of demand in each service market segment and region of the country. The current regulatory framework does not resolve the conflict of interest mentioned above. The most appropriate remedy to this conflict of interest is therefore to allow service providers to use own or third party telecommunications infrastructure to provide their services to the final customers instead of the infrastructure of their main competitor. In its resolution of 22 December 1994 the Council also approved the principle that infrastructure provision should be liberalized.